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Abstract—We review the characteristics of signalling storms
that have been caused by certain common apps and recently
observed in cellular networks, leading to system outages. We
then develop a mathematical model of a mobile user’s signalling
behaviour which focuses on the potential of causing such storms,
and represent it by a large Markov chain. The analysis of this
model allows us to determine the key parameters of mobile user
device behaviour that can lead to signalling storms. We then
identify the parameter values that will lead to worst case load
for the network itself in the presence of such storms. This leads to
explicit results regarding the manner in which individual mobile
behaviour can cause overload conditions on the network and its
signalling servers, and provides insight into how this may be
avoided.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile networks are vulnerable to signalling attacks which
overload the control plane through traffic patterns that target
the signalling procedures involved [1]–[4], by compromising
a large number of mobile devices as in network Denial of
Service (DoS) attacks [5], [6] or from outside the mobile
networks (e.g. the Internet). Similarly software and apps on
mobile devices [7], [8] can cause such disturbances through
frequent traffic bursts. Such attackers can actively probe the
network to infer the network’s radio resource allocation poli-
cies [9], [10] and identify IP addresses in specific locations
[11]. Indeed, a review of 180 cellular carriers around the world
revealed that 51% of them allow mobile devices to be probed
from the Internet by either assigning public IP addresses to
mobile devices or allowing IP spoofing or device-to-device
probing within the network [11], [12]. Signalling attacks may
also be launched in conjunction with the presence of crowds
in well identified locations such as sports arenas or concert
venues [13].
Signalling attacks are similar to signalling storms caused by
poorly designed or misbehaving mobile apps that repeatedly
establish and tear down data connections [14], generating
large amounts of signalling that may crash the network. Such
signalling storms are a serious threat to the availability and
security of cellular networks. While flash crowds last for a
short time during special occasions such as New Year’s Eve,
signalling storms are unpredictable and tend to persist until
the underlying problem is identified and corrected. This has
prompted the industry to promote best practices for developing
“network-friendly” mobile apps [15], [16].
A. Signalling Storms
Perhaps one of the most important features of smart phones
and tablets is the “always-on” connectivity, which enables
users to receive push messages, e.g. to notify of an incoming
message or VoIP call. This is maintained by having the mobile
device send periodic keep-alive messages to a cloud server.
However, if for any reason the cloud service becomes unavail-
able, then the mobile device will attempt to reconnect more
frequently generating signalling loads up to 20 times more than
normal as reported in recent incidents [17]. In 2012 a Japanese
mobile operator suffered a major outage [18] due to a VoIP
app that constantly polls the network even when users are
inactive. In another incident [19] the launch of a free version
of a popular game on Android caused signalling overload in a
large network due to frequent advertisements shown within the
app. Also, many mobile carriers have reported [20] outages or
performance issues caused by non-malicious but misbehaving
apps, yet the majority of those affected followed a reactive
approach to identify and mitigate the problem.
Signalling storms could also occur as a byproduct of large
scale malware infections [21], such as botnets, which target
mobile users rather than networks. A recent report by Kasper-
sky [22] revealed that the most frequently detected malware
threats affecting Android OS are (i) SMS trojans which send
costly messages without users’ consent, (ii) adware which
displays unwanted advertisements, and (iii) root exploits which
allow the installation of other malware or the device to become
part of a botnet. A sufficiently large number of users within a
single network falling victims to such attacks, which involve
frequent communications, could have a devastating impact on
the control plane of the network.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the effect of
signalling storms, as well as of signalling attacks, and analyse
in particular the manner in which such attacks can cause
maximum damage to the radio and core networks. The ap-
proach we take is based on the development of a mathematical
model of user signalling behaviour from which we derive
some useful analytical results. While the literature [23]–[25]
has focused on analysing signalling behaviour from an energy
consumption perspective, we hope that this work can offer to
mobile operators a greater understanding of bottlenecks and
vulnerabilities in the radio signalling system, so that network
parameters may be modified so as to mitigate for those effects
that lead to network outages [26], [27].
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II. MODELLING SIGNALLING OF A SINGLE USER
In the context of UMTS networks, bandwidth is managed
by the radio resource control (RRC) protocol which associates
a state machine with each user equipment (UE). There are
typically four RRC states, in order of increasing energy con-
sumption: IDLE, Paging Channel (cell PCH), low bandwidth
Forward Access Channel (cell FACH), and high bandwidth
Dedicated Channel (cell DCH). We will refer hereafter to state
cell X as X. State promotions are triggered by uplink (UL)
and downlink (DL) transmissions, and the move to FACH or
DCH is determined by the size of the radio link control (RLC)
buffer of the UE: if at any time the buffer exceeds a certain
threshold in either direction, the state will be promoted to
DCH. State demotions are triggered by inactivity timers.
Consider a UE that transitions from IDLE or dormant D
to FACH, perhaps later to DCH, and then sometimes directly
from D to DCH. We will let λL and λH be the rates at which
low and high bandwidth calls1 are normally made, and L and
H be the corresponding states when the call is actually taking
place in the sense that it is using the bandwidth of FACH and
DCH. Furthermore, we will denote by η the state when a low
bandwidth request is handled while the mobile is in DCH.
At the end of normal usage the call will transition from L to
` or from H, η to h, where ` and h are the states when the UE
is not using the bandwidth of FACH and DCH respectively;
thus, {L, `} ∈ FACH and {H, η, h} ∈ DCH. We denote the
rates at which low and high bandwidth calls terminate by µL
and µH . Since the amount of traffic exchanged in states L and
η is usually very small (otherwise it will trigger a transition
to H), we assume that their durations are independent but
stochastically identical.
If the UE does not start a new session for some time, it will
be demoted from h to ` or from ` to PCH which we denote
by P . The UE will then return from P to D after another
inactivity timer; however, because the mobile is not allowed
to communicate in the P state, it will first move to FACH,
release all signalling connections, and finally move to D. Let
τH , τL and τP be the time-out rates in states h, ` and P ,
respectively.
We are considering signalling attacks (or misbehaving apps)
which falsely induce the mobile to go from D,P to FACH or
DCH, or from FACH to DCH, without the user actually having
any usage for this request. The rates related to these malicious
transitions will be denoted αL and αH . Since in these cases
a transition to an actual bandwidth usage state does not take
place, unless the user starts a new session, the timers will
demote the state of the UE. Consequently, the attack results
in the usage of network resources both by the computation
and state transitions that occur for call handling, and through
bandwidth reservation that remains unutilised.
In summary, the state of the UE at time t is described by
the variable s(t) ∈ {N ,A,S(N ),A(N )} where:
• N = {D,P, `, L, h, η,H} represent the states occupied
by the UE during or after a “normal” call.
1A call refers to any UL/DL activity, e.g. data session, location update, etc.
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Fig. 1. The Markov model of a single user.
• A = {`A, hA, ηA} are similar to {`, h, η} but forced
by malicious traffic. Note that a transition to state ηA
happens either from L because of an attack that forces an
ongoing low bandwidth call to communicate over DCH,
or from hA because of a new normal low bandwidth call
that could have been handled through FACH.
• S(N ) and S(A) are the signalling states for respectively
normal and attack conditions, which capture the non-
negligible overhead needed in order to establish and
release network resources during state promotions and
demotions. We denote by σ−1XY the average transition
delay from state X to Y , where X,Y ∈ {D,P,L,H}
and the subscripts L and H are used here to represent
both normal and attack states in FACH and DCH.
Fig. 1 shows the different states, signalling phases and transi-
tions of the Markov model. The stationary equations for the
states in N are given by:
pi(D)[λH + αH + λL + αL] = pi(P )τP ,
pi(P )[λH + αH + λL + αL + τP ] = [pi(`) + pi(`A)]τL,
pi(`)[λH + αH + λL + τL] = pi(L)µL + pi(h)τH ,
pi(L)[λH + αH + µL] = [pi(D) + pi(P ) + pi(`) + pi(`A)]λL,
pi(h)[λH + λL + τH ] = pi(H)µH + pi(η)µL,
pi(η)[λH + µL] = pi(h)λL,
pi(H)µH =
∑
s∈{N ,A},s6=H
pi(s)λH ,
while the equations for the attack states A are:
pi(`A)[λH + αH + λL + τL] = [pi(D) + pi(P )]αL + pi(hA)τH ,
pi(hA)[λH + τH + λL] =
∑
s∈{D,P,`,`A}
pi(s)αH + pi(ηA)µL,
pi(ηA)[λH + µL] = pi(hA)λL + pi(L)αH .
We can express the normalisation condition as a weighted
sum of the probabilities of the states {N ,A}, i.e. 1 =
∑
s∈{N ,A} pi(s)ws or:
1 = pi(D)[1 +
ΛH
σDH
+
ΛL
σDL
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr[user in IDLE]
+ pi(P )[1 +
ΛH
σPH
+
ΛL
σPL
+ τP (
1
σPL︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr[user in PCH]
+
1
σLD
)]
+ (pi(`) + pi(`A))[1 +
ΛH
σLH
+
τL
σLP
] + pi(L)[1 +
ΛH
σLH
]
+ (pi(h) + pi(hA))[1 +
τH
σHL
] + pi(η) + pi(ηA) + pi(H)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr[user in DCH]
(1)
with ΛH = λH + αH and ΛL = λL + αL. Writing Λ =
ΛL + ΛH , qL = λLλH+µL , ρL =
λL
ΛH+µL
, and qH = λHµH , the
solution to the above set of equations becomes:
pi(D) =
τP τL
(Λ + τP )(Λ + τL)
G,
pi(P ) =
ΛτL
(Λ + τP )(Λ + τL)
G,
pi(L) = ρL G,
pi(H) = qH [
qLρLαH
λL
+ (1 + ρL)(
ΛH
τH
[1 + qL] + 1)] G,
pi(h) =
µH
λH [1 + qL] + τH
pi(H),
pi(η) = qL pi(h),
pi(`) =
1
ΛH + λL + τL
[µLρLG+
µHτHpi(H)
λH [1 + qL] + τH
],
pi(hA) =
αH
λH [1 + qL] + τH
[1 +
qLρLµL
λL
] G,
pi(ηA) =
αHqL
λH [1 + qL] + τH
[1 +
λH + τH + λL
ΛH + µL
]G,
pi(`A) =
1
ΛH + λL + τL
[
αLτL
Λ + τL
+
αHτH(1 +
qLρLµL
λL
)
λH [1 + qL] + τH
]G,
where G can be obtained from (1) yielding:
G−1 = [1 + ρL][qH +
ΛH
τH
{(1 + qL)(1 + qH) + wh − 1}]+
τL
Λ+τP
[τPwD + ΛwP ] + Λw`
Λ + τL
+ ρL[wL +
qL
λL
(1 + qH)αH ].
A. Signalling Load on the RNC and SGSN
Let nXY denote the number of signalling messages sent
or received by the radio network controller (RNC) when a
transition occurs from state X to state Y , then the signalling
rate generated by a single user due to both normal and
malicious traffic can be computed as:
γr = pi(D)[ΛHnDH + ΛLnDL] + pi(P )[ΛHnPH + ΛLnPL]
+ [pi(`) + pi(`A) + pi(L)]ΛHnLH
+ [pi(h) + pi(hA)]τHnHL
+ [pi(`) + pi(`A)]τL{nLP1L→P + nLD1L→D}
+ pi(P )τPnPD1L→P, (2)
TABLE I
NETWORK PARAMETERS
Transition Triggering Event nXY mXY σ−1XY
IDLE → FACH Low bandwidth UL/DL traffic
(e.g. location update, keep-alive
messages)
15 5 0.75
PCH → FACH 3 – 0.15
IDLE → DCH High bandwidth UL/DL traffic
(e.g. VoIP calls, video
streaming, web browsing)
20 5 1.0
PCH → DCH 10 – 0.5
FACH → DCH 7 – 0.35
DCH → FACH inactivity timer τ−1H = 2− 10s 5 – 0.25
FACH → PCH inactivity timer τ−1L = 2− 10s 2 – 0.1
PCH FACH−−−−→ IDLE inactivity timer τ−1p = 5−20min 6 2 0.3
where the characteristic function 1X→Y takes the value 1 if
the transition X → Y is implemented and 0 otherwise. Note
that the mobile network operator may not use PCH state, e.g.
when the vendor does not support it or it is disabled in order
to extend the battery life of mobile devices. In this case,
σPL, σLP and τP are set to ∞ so that the user is moved
directly from FACH to IDLE after an inactivity timer.
On the other hand, the core network is more protected from
signalling attacks since only transitions to/from state D trigger
signalling with the core. Let mXY ≤ nXY be the number of
control plane messages exchanged between the RNC and the
serving GPRS support node (SGSN) during such transitions,
then the signalling load on the core network from a single user
becomes:
γc = pi(D)[ΛHmDH + ΛLmDL] + pi(P )τPmPD1L→P
+ [pi(`) + pi(`A)]τLmLD1L→D. (3)
Table I summarises the state transition model along with
parameter values used in the numerical results: (i) the number
of signalling messages exchanged during state transitions are
obtained from the UMTS standards documentation, and can
also be found in the literature (e.g. [28]); (ii) typical values for
the inactivity timers τ−1H and τ
−1
L are in the range 2−10 sec-
onds, while τ−1P should be significantly longer (in the order of
minutes); and (iii) the average transition times are assumed to
be proportional to the number of signalling messages involved,
and normalised with respect to the transition IDLE → DCH
which is assumed to take 1 second.
III. MAXIMISING THE IMPACT OF AN ATTACK
If an attacker succeeds in inferring the radio network con-
figuration parameters (e.g. through active probing [9]–[11]),
then it is easy to monitor the user’s behaviour in order to
estimate λL, λH , µL and µH . The attacker can then maximise
the impact on the radio or core network by choosing the rate
of malicious traffic bursts αL and αH so as to maximise (2)
or (3). This is illustrated in Fig. 2 where we plot the average
rate of signalling messages that a misbehaving user generates
on the RNC and SGSN assuming αL = 0 and different values
of αH . The results indicate that there is indeed an optimum
value of αH which maximises the load on the core network,
while the load on the radio network increases monotonically
with the attack rate up to a maximum level.
Fig. 2. The average signalling load (msg/s) on RNC and SGSN with and
without PCH state versus attack rate αH when αL = 0, normal traffic is
characterised by λ−1L = 600, µ
−1
L = 5, λ
−1
H = 1800, µ
−1
H = 120, and
using the parameters of Table I with τ−1H = τ
−1
L = 5s and τ
−1
P = 5min.
αˆH in (6) provides a good estimate of the optimum attack rate.
The effect of PCH state is also examined in Fig. 2 showing
a significant reduction (about 95%) in the amount of control
plane traffic reaching the core network as compared to the case
where the user is moved directly from FACH to IDLE. In fact,
as the value of the timer τ−1P gets larger, an attacker would find
it extremely difficult to overwhelm the SGSN with signalling
load unless a very large number of UEs are compromised.
This feature also results in up to 30% drop in the amount of
signalling load traversing the radio network.
A. Radio Network
Numerical investigations suggest that the load on the radio
network increases with the frequency of the malicious bursts
up to a maximum level reached when either αH or αL tends
to infinity, depending on the parameters of the network as well
as the user’s traffic characteristics. If PCH is enabled then the
attacker could either induce the transition FACH → DCH as
soon as the channel is released, or take a two-step approach
to first move from PCH to FACH immediately after the timer
τ−1L expires then trigger another transition to DCH some time
later. Note that any other attack policy would be slowed down
by the long timer τ−1P and thus would not succeed in creating
a more severe impact. To investigate both policies, let us set
αL → ∞ so that the transition PCH → FACH is triggered
repeatedly, creating a load on the radio network given by:
γr =
nLH + nHL
θLH +
τL(ΛH+µL)
ΛH(ΛH+λL+µL)
θPL
+
nPL + nLP
θPL +
ΛH(ΛH+λL+µL)
τL(ΛH+µL)
θLH
, αL →∞,
where θXY = σ−1XY +(1+qL)(1+qH)τ
−1
Y +σ
−1
Y X . Now if we
maximise the above expression with respect to αH , we obtain
the following interesting result:
(α∗L, α
∗
H) =
{
(∞, 0), if nLH+nHLθLH ≤ nPL+nLPθPL ,
(0,∞), otherwise. (4)
Therefore, the load on the radio network can be maximised
through low (resp. high) bandwidth bursts that repeatedly
induce the transition PCH → FACH (resp. FACH → DCH) if
the condition [nLH+nHL]θ−1LH ≤ [nPL+nLP ]θ−1PL is (resp. is
not) satisfied. When PCH state is not used, we obtain similar
results, but the attack is maximised by continuously triggering
IDLE → FACH or FACH → DCH depending on whether the
condition [nLH + nHL]θ−1LH ≤ [nDL + nLD]θ−1DL is satisfied
or not, respectively. The worst case load on the RNC is then:
γ∗r = max
[
nXL + nLX
θXL
,
nLH + nHL
θLH
]
,
X = D or P depending on which transition L→ X is used.
B. Core Network
Signalling between the UE and core network happens for
a number of different reasons, but with respect to the RRC
state machine, it usually occurs when the UE moves from/to
the IDLE state. The attack against the core network can then
be launched more effectively by causing a transition to FACH,
rather than DCH, immediately after the user becomes IDLE so
as to avoid the timer τ−1H and the associated demotion delay.
Thus, optimally α∗H = 0, and the attack rate that maximises
the load on the core network can be shown to be:
α∗L =
√
c2 +
b− ca
θPLH
− c− λL, (5)
where:
θPLH = θPL + (1 + qL)τ
−1
L λHθLH ,
a = λH [2θPLH + σ
−1
DH − σ−1PL − σ−1LH ]
+ τP [θPLH + σ
−1
DL + σ
−1
LD] + (1 + qL)(1 + qH + λHθLH),
b = λ2H [θPLH + σ
−1
PH − σ−1PL − σ−1LH ]
+ λHτP [θPLH + σ
−1
DH + σ
−1
LD − σ−1LH ]
+ (λH + τP )(1 + qL)(1 + qH + λHθLH),
c = λH
mDH +mPD
mDL +mPD
.
Obviously, the attack is worst when there is no background
high bandwidth user traffic, in which case we end up with:
α∗L =
√
τP [1 +
λL
µL
]
θPL
− λL, λH = 0
and consequently the maximum possible load that an attacker
can impose on the SGSN is:
γ∗c =
mDL +mPD
σ−1DL + σ
−1
LP + σ
−1
PL + σ
−1
LD + (1 +
λL
µL
)( 1τL +
1
τP
+ 2Λ∗L
)
with Λ∗L = α
∗
L + λL. When τP → ∞, we get the intuitive
result α∗L =∞, i.e. the attacker should send a low-bandwidth
traffic burst as soon as the timer τ−1L expires, leading to
γ∗c = [mDL + mLD]θ
−1
DLH where θDLH = θDL + (1 +
Fig. 3. The average signalling load (msg/s) on SGSN versus the attack
rates αH , αL, when normal traffic profile is λ
−1
L = 300, µ
−1
L = 5, λ
−1
H =
600, µ−1H = 180, and the timers are τ
−1
H = τ
−1
L = 5s and τ
−1
P = 5 min.
qL)τ
−1
L λHθLH . In Fig. 3 we plot γc versus the attack rates,
and the numerical results indicate that (α∗L, α
∗
H) = (0.02, 0)
which coincide with the prediction of (5).
In practice, however, mounting an attack based solely on
low bandwidth bursts may not be feasible. To begin with,
it may be difficult to accurately estimate the RLC buffer’s
thresholds which determine whether a session will be handled
through the low or high speed channel, and also the thresholds
could differ from one RNC to another. Furthermore, many
operators choose to move users directly into DCH or use very
small RLC thresholds such that even keep-alive messages are
sent over the high speed channel [10]. Thus, a more practical
approach for an attacker is to assume that the majority of data
transmissions are handled through DCH, and in turn compute
an attack rate αˆH that maximises the load on the SGSN under
such circumstances, i.e.:
αˆH = arg max
αH
γc, when ΛH >> ΛL,
yielding:
αˆH =
3
√
−B
2
+
√
B2
4
+
A3
27
+
3
√
−B
2
−
√
B2
4
+
A3
27
− b
6a
− λH , (6)
where:
A = − b
2
12a2
, B =
b3
108a3
− c
2a
,
a = σ−1LH + [1 +
λH
µH
]τ−1H + σ
−1
HL,
b = τL(σ
−1
PH + [1 +
λH
µH
][τ−1H + τ
−1
L ] + σ
−1
HL + σ
−1
LP ) + τPa,
c = τLτP [1 +
λH
µH
].
When PCH is disabled, we have:
αˆH =
√√√√ τL[1 + λHµH ]
σ−1LH + [1 +
λH
µH
]τ−1H + σ
−1
HL
− λH
Fig. 4. The fraction of time the UE spends in DCH and FACH waiting for
a timer or state transition (solid line) and while using the bandwidth (dotted
line) as a function of αH , when αL = 0, λ
−1
L = 600, µ
−1
L = 5, λ
−1
H =
1800, µ−1H = 120, τ
−1
H = 2s, τ
−1
L = 5s and τ
−1
P = 10 min. Large inactive
times indicate anomalous signalling behaviour.
and the resulting load on the SGSN becomes:
γˆc =
mDH +mLD
σ−1DH + σ
−1
HL + σ
−1
LD + (1 +
λH
µH
)( 1τH +
1
τL
+ 2αˆH+λH )
.
Fig. 2 shows that αˆH provides a good estimate of the optimum
value α∗H even when λL > λH .
Fig. 4 illustrates the manner in which the frequency of
malicious traffic bursts affects signalling overhead as well as
the tail which is the time the UE spends in FACH or DCH
waiting for a time-out to expire. During these inactive periods,
the mobile wastes considerable radio resources in the network
as well as its own limited battery energy. As the attack rate
increases, the proportion of time the UE remains inactive in
either FACH or DCH also increases, while its average data
volume is almost constant. This observation could be used by
anomaly detection techniques to distinguish between normal
“heavy” users and attackers: the former can be recognised by
their low inactive times, while the latter can be detected by
frequent connection attempts and low data volume.
Finally, we examine in Fig. 5 the effect of a signalling
storm on the RNC and SGSN when the total number of
UEs is 10,000 and the percentage of misbehaving ones is
increased from 0 to 20%. Comparing the maximum load on
the targeted network component and the corresponding load
on the other, we see that PCH state prevents a situation
where both the RNC and SGSN are simultaneously exposed to
worst case loads, which happens when IDLE→ FACH is the
bottleneck transition in the radio network (cf. Section III-A).
In general, the radio network is less sensitive to the choice of
the malicious bursts, as long as they are frequent, and thus it
is more vulnerable to signalling storms. On the other hand, the
load on the core network changes dramatically when the storm
is optimised, which may not happen often, making signalling
overloads in the SGSN a less likely event. This does not,
however, include the effect of complex pricing and business
models used by the operator which may exacerbate signalling
load in the core network.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has focused on the behaviour of a mobile
network user with a view to determining network overload
Fig. 5. Load on RNC and SGSN versus percentage of mobile devices
participating in a storm out of 10,000 users, when λ−1L = 600, µ
−1
L =
5, λ−1H = 600, µ
−1
H = 180, τ
−1
H = τ
−1
L = 5s and τ
−1
P = 10 min. When
PCH is enabled a storm can cause maximum load on either the radio or core
network, but without PCH both of them could be targeted simultaneously.
in signalling servers and base stations that can result from
signalling misbehaviours such as signalling storms. Such mis-
behaviours can be caused by poorly designed mobile apps,
outages in cloud services, large scale malware infections, or
malicious network attacks. In the course of this work we
have derived a Markov model of user behaviour that can also
be exploited in other studies concerning mobile networks as
a whole. The Markov model has been solved analytically,
and used to derive conditions and parameters for which the
signalling misbehaviours can cause the largest damage and
which therefore need to be avoided. The analytical results
have been illustrated with several numerical examples, and
we expect that this work will lead to ideas relating to control
algorithms that can adaptively react to network measurements
so as to eliminate or mitigate the effect of signalling storms
and DoS attacks.
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